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RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN 
EXTRADITION LAW & RELATED IMMIGRATION 
LAW1  
 
Edward Fitzgerald  
 
This article provides a critical overview of some key human rights 
developments since January 2012 in the field of extradition and deportation 
law. It is arranged by reference to the key Articles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights likely to be engaged, namely, Articles 3, 8 and 
6. 
 
1.  ARTICLE 3  
 
Assurances and the Abu Qatada case 
  
The case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK2 represents something of a 
setback in the European Court of Human Rights for the cause of Article 3 
protection. Here the Court accepted the assurance of the Jordanian regime that 
Abu Qatada would not be tortured or ill-treated on his return despite 
acknowledging of the systemic practice of torture in Jordan. The Court 
refused to accept or adopt any general principle that assurances could not 
reduce the risk to an acceptable level even in a country which routinely 
practises torture.3 Instead, it laid down a list of relevant factors for the courts 
to apply when deciding on the reliability of „non-torture‟ assurances from the 
requesting or receiving state:  
 
“More usually, the Court will assess first, the quality of assurances 
given and, second, whether, in light of the receiving state‟s practices 
they can be relied upon. In doing so, the Court will have regard, inter 
alia, to the following factors: 
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(i) whether the terms of the assurances have been disclosed to the Court; 
(ii) whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague; 
(iii) who has given the assurances and whether that person can bind the 
receiving state; 
(iv) if the assurances have been issued by the central government of the 
receiving state, whether local authorities can be expected to abide by 
them; 
(v) whether the assurances concerns treatment which is legal or illegal in 
the receiving state; 
(vi) whether they have been given by a Contracting State; 
(vii) the length and strength of bilateral relations between the sending and 
receiving states, including the receiving state‟s record in abiding by 
similar assurances; 
(viii) whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively verified 
through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, including providing 
unfettered access to the applicant‟s lawyers; 
(ix) whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in 
the receiving state, including whether it is willing to co-operate with 
international monitoring mechanisms (including international human-
rights NGOs), and whether it is willing to investigate allegations of torture 
and to punish those responsible; 
(x) whether the applicant has previously been ill-treated in the receiving 
state; and 
(xi) whether the reliability of the assurances has been examined by the 
domestic courts of the sending/contracting State.” 4 
 
Applying these guidelines in the Othman case, the Court relied on the 
strong bilateral relationship between the UK and Jordan, the specificity and 
detail of the memorandum of understanding between the two states, and the 
high profile of Mr Othman as removing any „real risk‟ of torture despite the 
evidence of systemic torture there. It confirmed that the efficacy of assurances 
to reduce Article 3 risks to an acceptable level (i.e. to remove the „real risk‟ of 
ill-treatment or torture) must be judged on a case by case basis. This put an 
end to an emerging jurisprudence, exemplified in Ismoilov5 that non-torture 
assurances would simply not be accepted from states where torture is systemic 
or endemic. 
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The test in extradition cases 
  
Harkins & Edwards v UK6 is important for clarifying that the Article 3 
test is the same for both extradition and deportation cases, namely the 
existence of substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
torture or ill-treatment:  
 
“The Court therefore concludes that the Chahal7 ruling (as reaffirmed 
in Saadi8) should be regarded as applying equally to extradition and 
other types of removal from the territory of a contracting state and 
should apply without distinction between the various forms of ill-
treatment which are prevented by Article 3.”9  
 
This was a significant rejection of the „relativist‟ approach to Article 3 
protection advocated for extradition cases by Lord Hoffman in Wellington.10 
Here, Lord Hoffman had reasoned that protection from ill-treatment was a 
relative concept and that the public interest in upholding extradition 
arrangements and avoiding impunity somehow justified a „higher threshold‟ 
in order to find a violation of Article 3 in extradition cases. The European 
Court rejected this and reaffirmed the principle that the protection from ill-
treatment under Article 3 was „absolute‟.11 However the European Court did 
recognise that because „the Convention does not purport to be a means of 
requiring the Convention states to impose Convention standards on other 
states...treatment which might violate Article 3 because of an act or omission 
of a contracting state might not attain the minimum level of severity which is 
required for there to be a violation of Article 3 in an expulsion or 
extradition‟.12  
 
Mandatory life sentences without parole 
  
The Harkins case itself involved the applicant‟s exposure in the State of 
Florida to a mandatory sentence of life without parole on conviction for 
murder on the basis of the outdated „felony murder‟ rule. The Court 
distinguished between the two types of sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole:  
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i) A discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole; 
ii) A mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.13 
 
The Court held that the Article 3 issues did not arise at the time the 
sentence was imposed but only at the point – many years down the line – 
when „continued incarceration no longer serves any legitimate penological 
purpose.‟ It continued that no Article 3 issue arose unless the life sentence 
was „irreducible de facto and de iure‟.14 The Court reasoned that, in Mr 
Harkins‟ case, the time at which his incarceration no longer served any 
legitimate penological purpose might not ever arise, because his crime 
certainly deserved lengthy detention. And if that point was ever reached, there 
was still the power of executive clemency vested in the governor of Florida.15 
The net effect is that extradition will be refused on Article 3 grounds only 
when the mandatory life sentence, that will foreseeably be imposed in the 
requesting state, will be grossly disproportionate on the facts at the time when 
it is imposed. The Court rejected any argument based on such gross 
disproportionality in Mr Harkins‟ case – though he was only twenty at the 
time and would be sentenced to life without parole on the basis of the 
discredited felony-murder rule.16 This is a disappointing result. It shows just 
how difficult it will be to rely on disproportionality of sentence as a ground 
for refusing extradition. But, the European Court has at least now clearly 
accepted that, in principle, extradition can be refused when the foreseeable 
sentence in the receiving state will be grossly disproportionate to the facts of 
the case.  
 
Prison conditions in ‘Supermax’ 
  
In Ahmad & Others17 the European Court rejected the Article 3 challenge 
to extradition on grounds of prison conditions in Supermax Prisons in the 
United States and, in particular, the ADX Florence prison in Colorado. The 
Court did not distinguish between the applicable test for the inhumanity of 
„solitary‟ conferred in a domestic European case and in a „foreign‟ extradition 
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case.18 It held that indefinite detention in solitary confinement might well 
„reach the minimum level of severity required for a violation of Article 3‟:  
 
“If an applicant were at real risk of being detained indefinitely at 
ADX, then it would be possible for conditions to reach the minimum 
level of severity required for a violation of Article 3.”19 
 
However, the European Court accepted (highly contentious) evidence of a 
real possibility of progress out of the isolation regime and, on that basis, held 
that extradition to face detention in ADX Colorado would not violate Article 3 
(para 223). There was a further unsuccessful attempt by the applicants to stop 
extradition by the Home Secretary on the basis that the European Court had 
misunderstood the evidence, and there clearly was a risk of indefinite, long-
term detention in solitary.20 Overall, the future prospects of ever stopping 
extradition to the United States on grounds of prison conditions do not appear 
good. 
 
Prison conditions in other extradition contexts 
  
Even so, there have been Article 3 rulings in the English courts blocking 
extradition to other jurisdictions on grounds of prison conditions and these 
have clearly been influenced by the recent development in case law. 
In Lutsyuk v Government of Ukraine21 the Divisional Court took as its 
starting point on prison conditions the decision of the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal in the case of PS (Prison Conditions, Military Service) 
Ukraine v Secretary of State for the Home Department CG:22 
 
“Imprisonment in the Ukraine is likely to expose the detainee to the 
real risk of inhuman or degrading ill-treatment that would cross the 
Article 3 threshold.” 
 
This finding of a specialist tribunal on the very issue before the court was 
stated to be „an authoritative starting point‟23 and of a kind that should 
„usually be determinative of the specific issue it addresses‟,24 where the same 
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issue arises in the extradition context. The requested person did not have to 
prove which particular prison he would be sent to, merely that there was a 
„real risk‟ that he would be detained in a jail where he would be subjected to 
ill-treatment.25 This is an important judgment for which the finding in Harkins 
as to the equivalence of the test on immigration and extradition clearly paved 
the way – though the Court held there was no real inconsistency between Lord 
Hoffman‟s approach in Wellington and that of the European Court in Harkins. 
In Russian Federation v Trefilov26 District Judge Evans held the prison 
conditions in Russia were such that extradition would be inconsistent with the 
„absolute‟ prohibition on extradition to face Article 3 treatment in a requesting 
state (whether in the form of „inhuman or degrading treatment or torture.‟27) 
He adopted the submissions of counsel which in turn relied heavily on the 
judgment of the European Court in Ananyev v Russia.28 That pilot judgment of 
the European Court held that „there had been a repeated and ongoing failure 
by the Russian Federation to address the concerns underpinning a series of 
judgments ... in which violations of Article 3 had been found‟. The consistent 
pattern of inhuman conditions due to overcrowding in pre-trial detention 
meant that there was a systematic violation of Article 3. Trefilov marks a new 
departure in Russian extradition cases. Effectively it means that, unless some 
new development ensues or some new form of assurance is given, any 
extradition to Russia will be barred when there is a real risk of pre-trial 
detention on the basis that this exposes the individual to a real risk of inhuman 
conditions contrary to Article 3. 
In the case of Lithuania v Liam Campbell,29 the Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal rejected the Lithuanian government‟s appeal against the Recorder of 
Belfast‟s decision to refuse extradition on Article 3 grounds – because of the 
prison conditions on remand in Lithuania. Key aspects of the Court‟s 
reasoning can be summarised as follows: 
 
i) It relied on the evidence of Professor Rod Morgan of the Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture on the deplorable state of Lithuanian prisons, 
the overcrowding and the consequent violence – both inter-prisoner and 
by prison guards. 
ii) The Court relied on the absolute nature of the prohibition on extradition 
to face inhuman conditions established by the European Court in Harkins 
(see para 21). 
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iii) It declined (at para 32) to follow a line of English decisions that had 
previously held that extradition to Lithuania did not involve a violation of 
Article 3 on grounds of prison conditions there, the most recent of which 
being Janovic v Prosecutor General’s Office Lithuania.30  
iv) It rejected the argument that there was an irrebuttable presumption that 
European Convention countries would comply with Article 3 (a fallacy 
first promulgated by Mitting J in Rot,31 involving Poland, but 
subsequently rejected by the English Divisional Court in Agius v Court of 
Magistrates Malta.32 
 
This is a significant judgment, and again owes something both in its spirit 
and its ratio to the clarification in Harkins of the absolute nature of the Article 
3 protection in extradition cases. 
 
Conclusion on Article 3 developments regarding assurances and prison 
conditions 
 
It does appear that the clarification in Harkins & Edwards that the Article 
3 test in extradition cases is an absolute one has had some real impact on the 
courts‟ readiness to refuse extradition on Article 3 grounds – particularly in 
cases involving prison conditions. But the evidence as to the inhumanity of 
prison conditions still has to be recent, specific, and founded on expert 
evidence or judicial findings of Article 3 violations. On a practical level, 
evidence of systemic brutality or ill-treatment by prison officers or fellow 
prisoners may be more compelling than general evidence of poor conditions 
and overcrowding. But both are significant. 
Despite the European Court‟s acceptance of the very specific and detailed 
assurances in Othman – together with the „tailor-made‟ monitoring 
mechanism, assurances will not always work. In particular, this will be 
unlikely to thwart an Article 3 argument in the following situations: 
 
i) Where the assurances are vague or generalised rather than specific and 
effective; 
ii) Where there is doubt as to the requesting state‟s power to enforce them 
(as in Zakaev v Russia 33 (and Chahal34), or to monitor compliance; 
iii) Where torture is systemic and impunity for its practice is general in the 
requesting state (Ismailov35); 
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iv) Where there is no sound diplomatic basis for reliance on the requesting 
state‟s promises or doubts as to its consistency (as in the case of AS and 
DD v Libya,36 where the assurances came from Colonel Gaddafi, and the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) found he was too 
unpredictable and quixotic to be relied on despite the glowing write-up of 
Gaddafi as a „man of honour‟ provided by the Foreign Office! 
 
2. THE SUICIDE CASES 
  
The 2013 decision of the Secretary of State to refuse the extradition of 
Garry McKinnon on Article 3 grounds has focused attention once more on 
suicide risk as a reason to refuse extradition. It was on grounds of the high 
risk of suicide that the Secretary of State based her decision. 
The most helpful and simple test in this area is that distilled by Mr Justice 
Bean from earlier authorities in the case of Marius Wrobel v Poland.37 The 
earlier cases from which he derived the test were Rot (below), Prosser38and 
Jansons v Latvia.39 The relevant test was whether there was „independent and 
convincing evidence‟ of a psychiatric nature of „a very high risk of suicide if 
the fugitive is returned‟. The test was developed in the Section 25 context 
(which has to do with physical or mental health making it oppressive to 
extradite) but was held to be consistent with the correct approach in Article 3 
and Article 8 cases. This was the test that the Secretary of State was invited to 
apply in the McKinnon case and which she appears to have applied. 
It is obviously necessary that the suicide risk should arise from mental 
disorder, or be heavily influenced by it. Hence the need for psychiatric 
evidence. A rational decision to commit suicide if extradited is not a good 
ground for refusal to refute extradition: see Turner v Government of USA.40 
Otherwise defendants could blackmail the courts into refusing extradition. 
It is also necessary to consider what measures are in place in the 
requesting state (and in transit) to remove or reduce the risk of suicide to an 
acceptable level: see Turner v Government of USA (above). In the 2013 case 
of Poland v Wolkowicz41 the President (Lord Justice Thomas) approved the 
propositions laid down by Aikens LJ in Turner v Government of USA at 
paragraph 28. These were: 
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“(1) the court has to form an overall judgment on the facts of the 
particular case: United States v Tollman [2008] 3 All ER 150 per 
Moses LJ [50]. (2) A high threshold has to be reached in order to 
satisfy the court that a requested person‟s physical or mental condition 
is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him: Howes v 
HM’s Advocate [2009] SCL 341 and the cases there cited by Lord 
Reed in a judgment of the Inner House. (3) The court must assess the 
mental condition of the person threatened with extradition and 
determine if it is linked to a risk of a suicide attempt if the extradition 
order were to be made. There has to be a „substantial risk that [the 
appellant] will commit suicide‟. The question is whether, on the 
evidence the risk of the appellant succeeding in committing suicide, 
whatever steps are taken is sufficiently great to result in a finding of 
oppression: see Jansons v Latvia [2009] EWHC 1845 at [24] and [29]. 
(4) The mental condition of the person must be such that it removes 
his capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide, otherwise it will 
not be his mental condition but his own voluntary act which puts him 
at risk of dying and if that is the case there is no oppression in 
ordering extradition: Rot v District Court of Lubin, Poland [2010] 
EWHC 1820 at [13] per Mitting J. (5) On the evidence, is the risk that 
the person will succeed in committing suicide, whatever steps are 
taken, sufficiently great to result in a finding of oppression: ibid. (6) 
Are there appropriate arrangements in place in the prison system of 
the country to which extradition is sought so that those authorities can 
cope properly with the person‟s mental condition and the risk of 
suicide: ibid at [26]. (7) There is a public interest in giving effect to 
treaty obligations and this is an important factor to have in mind: 
Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] 2 AC 487.” 
  
The fourth proposition in Turner suggests that „the mental condition of the 
person must be such that it removes the capacity to remove the impulse to 
commit suicide‟. This is a psychologically crude and legally questionable test. 
The psychiatric condition must be a cause, or possibly the main reason, for 
the suicidal intention. But to talk of irresistible impulse is not really 
appropriate. For instance, a person suffering from severe depression sees the 
world differently and may therefore form a suicidal intention because of their 
depressive world view and then find it difficult to restrain themselves. That is 
not to say that they surrender to an irresistible impulse if they take their life. 
And, for the purposes of Article 3, the existence of an irresistible impulse 
should not be necessary, provided a diagnosed mental disorder causes or 
influences the high risk of suicide. 
In Wolkowicz (above), Sir John Thomas suggested that where extradition 
is to a Council of Europe jurisdiction, there should be a presumption that 
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effective preventative measures will be in place. But it is important that any 
such presumption must be rebuttable in the light of specific evidence either 
that preventative measures will not prove effective or that they are not 
actually available in the requesting state. 
 
Alternatives to Article 3 
 
Article 3 has the advantage of providing an absolute prohibition on 
extradition when its high threshold is met in suicide cases. But it is a high 
threshold. By contrast, Article 8 involves an overall balancing of the harm to 
private life (which includes the effect of a person‟s extradition on their 
susceptibility to suicide) against the public interest in upholding extradition 
arrangements. It may be easier to rely on Article 8 when the crime is of no 
great gravity – as in Jansons v Latvia (above) and the successful „children‟ 
case of F-K.42 In such cases, the argument would be the fact that the crime is 
of no great gravity means that the public interest in extradition is not so great 
as to outweigh the very high risk of suicide if the requested person is 
extradited. As to Section 25, it would appear that the Section 25 test has been 
broadly assimilated to the test under Article 3 and Article 8 (see Wrobel 
above). But reliance on it does serve to emphasise that the basis of the 
objection to extradition is the mental health of the requested person. 
 
3.  ARTICLE 8: THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE AND THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN 
 
The central issue in the Supreme Court judgment in HH, PH & F-K 
(above) was whether the rights of young children who were dependent on a 
requested person could outweigh the public interest in extradition and justify 
the refusal of extradition on Article 8 grounds. In the case of F-K, the 
Supreme Court held that it would be a violation of Article 8 to extradite to 
Poland a mother of five with two very young children charged with offences 
of fraud of „no great gravity‟ dating back some sixteen years. The Court held 
that the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements was outweighed 
by the „inevitable severe harm to the interest of the two youngest children in 
doing so‟ (per Baroness Hale at para 48; Lord Hope at para 91; Lord Brown at 
para 96; Lord Manse at para 102; Lord Judge at para 133; and Lord Kerr at 
para 147). By contrast in the case of HH, which involved the extradition of 
two parents to Italy for very serious crimes of drugs importation, the Court 
held that the public interest in extradition outweighed the best interests of the 
children even though extradition would lead to the separation of the children 
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THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
99 
from the primary care-giver and the likelihood of the children being separated 
and taken into care. 
The most significant aspect of the case was the recognition that Article 3.1 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child applied to 
extradition hearings involving the parents of a child. It required the court to 
treat the „best interests of the child‟ as a „primary consideration‟ (per Baroness 
Hale at paras 10-11 and 33-34). This did not mean that the best interests of 
dependent children would generally or normally prevail over the public 
interest in extradition. Their best interests were a primary consideration, not 
the primary consideration and could be outweighed by the public interest in 
extradition. Indeed, generally this would be the case. But in every case the 
two interests had to be balanced against each other in order to determine 
whether extradition was compatible with Article 8. Thus as the case of F-K 
showed, in an especially compelling case the best interests of the child could 
prevail over the public interest in extradition: here the factor of delay and the 
relative lack of gravity of the offences told in favour of extradition being 
disproportionate. 
The Supreme Court recognised that the criminal justice context meant that 
the public interest factor was greater in extradition cases than in deportation 
cases. But a balancing exercise was nonetheless required in every case. Lord 
Judge suggested that one relevant factor was as follows: 
 
“When resistance to extradition is advanced, as in effect it is in each 
of these appeals, on the basis of the article 8 entitlements of dependent 
children and the interests of society in their welfare, it should only be 
in very rare cases that extradition may properly be avoided if, given 
the same broadly similar facts, and after making proportionate 
allowance as we do for the interests of dependent children, the 
sentencing courts here would nevertheless be likely to impose an 
immediate custodial sentence: any other approach would be 
inconsistent with the principles of international comity.”43 
 
The ruling in F-K was a breakthrough in the sense that it was the first time 
that the courts had refused extradition in the interests of an innocent juvenile 
and their dependence on the requested person. Subsequently the courts have 
not always been true to the spirit of the decision and the importance it 
attached to the best interests of the child. Thus in Czech Republic v JP44 the 
extradition of a mother was upheld by the Divisional Court as proportionate 
and consistent with Article 8 – even though her crimes were of even lesser 
gravity than those of F-K, and she had three young children dependent on her 
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 At para 132. 
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as their primary carer. The court declined to grant a certificate to resolve the 
glaring inconsistency between its decision and that of the Supreme Court in F-
K. However in MS, the Divisional Court did adopt a broadly similar approach 
to that in F-K and refused extradition on Article 8 grounds where the crimes 
were of no great gravity and there was a risk to her two very young children 
and also to the mental health of her vulnerable fourteen year old daughter, if 
she was extradited. 
 
4. ARTICLE 6 CASES 
 
A mention of Article 6 as a ground for refusing extradition is also 
necessary. This is because of the great controversy created by the European 
Court‟s decision that the extradition of Abu Qatada45 would involve a 
violation of the Article as it would expose him to the „real risk‟ of a „flagrant 
denial of justice‟. This was on the basis that on his return there was a real risk 
that the main evidence against him at his retrial would consist of confession 
evidence obtained from two alleged co-conspirators who had been tortured (or 
may well have been tortured) into making their confessions (which 
incriminated both themselves and him). 
Firstly, the Court emphasised that for a country to be found in breach of 
Article 6 by reason of extradition or expulsion to another state where there 
was a risk of an unfair trial, the test was a high and exacting one. The 
prospective trial in a foreign state would have to constitute a „flagrant denial 
of justice‟ – which meant more than an unfair trial for the purpose of Article 6 
when dealing with a trial taking place in the European Convention state 
itself.46 The Court had previously given some examples in cases such as 
Einhorn,47 Bader48 and Al-Moayad49 but it had never before „found that an 
expulsion would be in violation of Article 6‟ in any case since the test was 
formulated in Soering.50 It emphasised that:  
 
“What is required is a breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed 
by Article 6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or 
                                                     
45
 Ibid n 2 Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom - 8139/09 Judgment 
17.1.2012 [Section IV]. 
46
 At paras 258-62.  
47
 Einhorn v France (Application No 71555/01, 16 October 2001. 
48
 Bader and Kanbor v Sweden(Application no. 13284/04) 8 November 2005.  
49
 Al-Moayad v Germany (Application no 35865/03) European Court of Human 
Rights 20 February.   
50
 Soering v United Kingdom 161 Eur Ct HR (ser. A) (1989). 
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destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that 
Article.”51 
 
It is significant that the English courts have recognised the trial in a 
military court at Guantanamo would satisfy the test of a flagrant denial of 
justice (Ahmed), and that trial by a court that was not independent and 
impartial would also do so: see Rwanda v Brown.52  
Essentially the Court‟s reasoning was that trial on the basis of torture 
evidence would constitute a flagrant denial of justice because the prohibition 
of the use of torture evidence is a universal norm:  
 
“More fundamentally, no legal system based upon the rule of law can 
countenance the admission of evidence – however reliable – which 
has been obtained by such a barbaric practice as torture. The trial 
process is a cornerstone of the rule of law. Torture evidence damages 
irreparably that process. It substitutes force for the rule of law and 
taints the reputation of any court that admits it. Torture evidence is 
excluded to protect integrity of the trial process and, ultimately, the 
rule of law itself.”53 
 
The Court further found that all that could be expected of the applicant 
was that he showed that there was a real risk of the admission of evidence 
obtained by torture at his forthcoming „retrial‟ on return to Jordan. (He had 
also been convicted in absentia on the basis of his co-accused‟s confession but 
was entitled to a retrial on return.) The Court‟s reasoning appears to justify a 
twofold test: -  
The first test is whether there is a real risk that the confession evidence of 
his co-accused was obtained by torture.  
 
“The Court has found that a flagrant denial of justice will arise where 
evidence obtained by torture is admitted in criminal proceedings. The 
applicant has demonstrated that there is a real risk that Abu Hawsher 
and Al Hamasher were tortured into providing evidence against him 
and the Court has found that no higher burden of proof can be 
imposed upon him. Having regard to this conclusion, the Court, in 
keeping with the Court of Appeal, found that there is a real risk that 
the applicant‟s retrial would amount to a flagrant denial of justice.”54 
 
                                                     
51
 Ibid n 2 at para 260. 
52
 [2009] EWHC 770 (Admin). 
53 
Ibid n 2  para 264. 
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 Ibid n 2 para 282. 
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The Court also found that there was concrete and compelling evidence 
that Abu Hawsher and Al Hamasher had been tortured into confessing (para 
285). 
The second test is whether there was a real risk that such evidence would 
be admitted at the trial. Here the court relied on the finding of SIAC in 
England that there was a high probability that the State Security Court would 
admit the confession evidence. It further referred to the questionable 
reputation of the State Security Court in investigating allegations of torture. 
The Secretary of State did not appeal from the European Court‟s decisions 
to the Grand Chamber. Instead she negotiated further assurances from Jordan, 
and obtained further information as to the likely course of the trial. The 
principal assurance obtained was that Mr Othman would be tried by a State 
Security Court panel composed of three civilians rather than a panel 
consisting of two military and one civilian members. Reliance was also placed 
on the amendment of the constitution to prohibit the admission of evidence 
obtained by torture and the (disputed) evidence of an expert that the 
confession evidence would not be admissible at Mr Othman‟s retrial. 
SIAC‟s finding was that neither the change in the composition of the 
court, nor the amendment to the constitution could remove the „real risk‟ that 
the confession evidence would be admitted at trial. SIAC further indicated 
that it did not propose to go behind the European Court‟s finding that the 
confession evidence may well have been obtained by torture and that there 
was „concrete and compelling‟ evidence to support this fact. 
 
 
Some final thoughts on Article 6 
 
The principal controversy throughout was whether the „real risk‟ test was 
sufficiently exacting, and whether, providing there was a hearing at which the 
torture issues were considered by an „independent‟ court, it was still possible 
to claim that the prospective trial would constitute a „flagrant denial of 
justice‟. This is the issue now to be determined by the Court of Appeal.  
In fact, the „flagrant denial‟ finding is far more common than is generally 
realised. It is certainly true that the European Court itself has only found the 
real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in one case – that of Abu Qatada. But 
the English courts have recognised that the trial process in a foreign country 
would fail the „flagrant denial‟ test in a number of other cases. For example, 
where the „flagrant denial of justice‟ would be involved in trial by a military 
court in Guantanamo (in the case of Ahmad); by trials in Russia for opponents 
of Putin or alleged Chechen „terrorists‟ such as Akmed Zakaev; and the trial 
in Rwanda of alleged Hutu mass murderers. All these prospective trials have 
been held to involve a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice. So the concept 
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has continuing vigour and application and is an important safeguard in the 
field of both deportation and extradition. 
 
